The rehabilitation of prisoners will not be helped by giving them the vote
When a person commits a crime against the peace and security of their community, it is essential that the gravity of such behaviour is reflected in society’s response. For justice to be done, it is necessary that those convicted not only have their freedom of movement restricted, but are shown that their treatment of others separates them from those others. In a democratic society this can and has been demonstrated by ensuring that no prisoner has the right to vote.
It is right that we should always seek to rehabilitate those who are imprisoned so that they can rejoin society with refreshed aspirations and renewed opportunity, but this will not be achieved or helped along by giving prisoners the right to vote. Not once in my 18 years as a Criminal Defence Solicitor did a client in prison ever complain that they could not vote or demand the right to do so.
However, this principle must be subject to the need to ensure the rule of law. Deliberately choosing to ignore the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights would in effect leave all citizens uncertain as to what the law was, and would set a dangerous precedent allowing Governments and politicians to ignore what they don’t like. A democracy governed by the principle of limited state power must not set such a precedent.
The practical problem is because the previous government stalled a change in the law for 5 years we now face up to 2,500 compensation claims from prisoners which could cost the taxpayer as much as £160 million - money that we can ill afford. It would be outrageous in this time of austerity for victims and their families to endure compensation awards going to prisoners.
I believe the British Government must do the minimum that is necessary, but only that, to act in accordance with the European Court of Human Rights. It may be that any threshold Parliament sets can be challenged in the courts. The only course then available will be to give discretion to the judges with Parliament’s view expressed in sentencing guidelines.
Yet there is a wider principle at stake here. While I recognise the court’s legitimacy, in this case it has clearly overstepped the explicit intentions of the authors and of the signatories of the convention. Before signing up to the convention Britain specifically ensured that the words “universal suffrage” were removed from the article covering political participation. That these words were removed shows that the court’s decision pushes the document further than is, and ever was, desirable. The way the Court exercises its function must be revisited to ensure that the sovereignty of our Parliament and people is respected.